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BLD-042        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2652 
___________ 
 
EDWARD VINCENT RAY, JR., 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THOMAS OWENS, Detective, Johnstown Police Department,  
Individually and in his Official Capacity; BETH MCCONNELL,  
Caseworker, Children and Youth Services, Individually and in  
her official Capacity; TINA HIPPLER, Caseworker for Children and  
Youth Services, in her individual and official capacity; MICHELE  
SHANNON, caseworker "supervisor" for Children and Youth Services,  
in her individual and official capacity; CAMBRIA COUNTY  
CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-15-cv-00115) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
November 5, 2015 
Before:  FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: November 12, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 2 
 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Edward Ray Jr. is an Arizona state prisoner who appeals from the District Court’s 
order dismissing his claims against a Johnstown Police Department detective and three 
employees of the Cambria County Children and Youth Services office (“CYS”).  Ray 
claims that Appellees violated his constitutional rights by ignoring his complaints that his 
daughter was being molested, and by failing to take her into protective custody.  Ray 
states that between November 2009 and March 2015, he wrote letters to Thomas Owens, 
a detective with the Johnstown Police Department, complaining that an individual, H.S., 
was sexually assaulting his minor daughter.  He alleges that he also wrote several letters 
to Appellees Beth McConnell and Tina Hippler, caseworkers at CYS, about the assaults.  
Owens allegedly ignored his letters, and while CYS acknowledged a formal report of 
child abuse, it closed the matter after little to no investigation, and sent him a letter 
informing him that the case was closed.  Ray further alleges that H.S. was arrested and 
charged with 168 counts of sexual abuse of Ray’s daughter on March 23, 2015.  
Appellees, therefore, should have taken his daughter into protective custody after he 
notified them of the abuse, and their failure to do so caused her to suffer unspeakable 
injuries, and violated his constitutional rights as her parent. 
 The District Court dismissed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for 
failure to state a claim.  The Court explained that a state agency’s failure to protect a 
child from harm against another private citizen is not a constitutional violation unless the 
state has a special custodial relationship with the child, or unless the child suffers harm as 
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a result of a state-created danger.  Since Ray’s daughter was residing with her mother at 
the time Ray complained to Appellees, the Court concluded, no such special relationship 
existed.   Additionally, it concluded that Ray failed to plead facts to establish that 
Appellees in any way placed his daughter in increased danger.  Because this appeal 
presents no substantial question, we will affirm. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of 
review is plenary.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We may 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order where there is no substantial question 
presented by the appeal.  Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
 While we are sympathetic to Ray’s claims, provided they are true, this appeal 
presents no substantial question.  The failure of a state agency to protect a child against 
harm from a private citizen is not a violation of the right to due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195-201 (1989).  Such an affirmative obligation may exists in 
two instances; first, where the state has a special relationship with the child, Morrow v. 
Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 167-68 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc), such as when the state takes the 
child into its custody and holds him there against his will, DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-
200; and second, where a state actor has put the victim in increased danger of harm by the 
private citizen,  Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir. 1996).   
 Ray fails to state a claim under the special relationship theory.  Ray’s daughter 
was under the care of her mother, and not the state, at the time Ray reported the abuse she 
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suffered.  Therefore, the District Court correctly concluded that Appellees had no legal 
duty to her under this theory. 
 Ray also fails to state a due process claim under the state-created danger theory.  
Such a claim has four elements.  Ray argues that the harm to his daughter was forseeable 
and fairly direct, that state actors acted in willful disregard for her safety, and that there 
existed a special relationship between her and the state.  Properly pled, those allegations 
would satisfy the first three elements.  Id.  Ray’s complaint does not satisfy the fourth 
element, however.  He must allege that “the state actors used their authority to create an 
opportunity that otherwise would not have existed for the third party’s crime to occur.”  
Id.  Ray has not alleged that the police and CYS staff used their authority to create the 
opportunity for H.S. to sexually abuse his daughter, and that without their involvement, 
H.S. would not have had that opportunity.  Ray therefore has not stated a claim under this 
theory. 
 Ray also appears to assert an Equal Protection claim by arguing that Appellees 
failed to investigate his complaints because he is an inmate.  Inmate status, however, is 
not a protected class.  Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2001).  Nor 
has Ray demonstrated that Appellees violated a fundamental right.  Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202, 214 (1982) (a plaintiff may assert an Equal Protection claim by demonstrating 
that the state violated a fundamental right).  The state has no affirmative obligation to 
protect a child from being harmed by a private citizen, DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-201; 
therefore, Ray has no fundamental right to the protection he sought for his daughter.  
Under either analysis, Ray has not stated an Equal Protection claim. 
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   Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm. 
 
